Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

2009

An Alternate Approach to Channeling?
Mark P. McKenna
Notre Dame Law School, markmckenna@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 873 (2009-2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/194

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

AN ALTERNATE APPROACH TO CHANNELING?

MARK P. MCKENNA*
ABSTRACT

Intellectual property law has developed a variety of doctrines to
police the boundaries between various forms of protection. Courts
and scholars alike overwhelmingly conceive of these doctrines in
terms of the nature of the objects of protection. The functionality
doctrine in trademark law, for example, defines the boundary
between trademark and patent law by identifying and refusing
trademark protection to features that play a functional role in a
product'sperformance.Likewise, the useful article doctrine works at
the boundaryof copyright and patent law to identify elements of an
article'sdesign that are dictated by function and to channelprotection of those features to the patent system. These are important
doctrinal tools, and they play valuable roles in the overall intellectual property system.
These channeling doctrines, however, reflect an incomplete sense
of the interplay between various modes of intellectual property
protection. Because they focus on subject matter, the existing
channeling doctrines only prevent parties from claiming multiple
forms of protection for particularfeatures. They therefore ignore
firms'ability to use various intellectualproperty rightsas alternative
appropriationmechanisms even when those rights apply to different
aspects of a product or service. This Article considers how, if at all,
this use of intellectual property rights as alternative appropriation
mechanisms ought to inform the boundariesof the various intellectualproperty regimes. In particular,it considers whether alternative
channeling doctrines-ones that would force claimants to elect
among types of protection even when those forms apply to different
features-areappropriate.
* Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School. Thanks to Mark Lemley and Mike
Meurer for feedback on this Article, and to Erin Czerney and Dwight King for valuable
research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

Most discussions of the boundaries of intellectual property (IP)
law deal with geographic boundaries-the extent to which IP rights
in one country ought to reach activities in another---or subject
matter boundaries-the nature and scope of particular IP rights,
especially when multiple IP rights might be implicated. This Article
focuses on the boundaries of particular forms of protection, but it
does so in a somewhat different way. Rather than focusing on the
forms of protection available for particular features or types of
objects, it focuses on the ways firms can use different forms of IP
protection as complementary or alternative appropriation mechanisms, even when the various types of protection apply to different
features of a product. I argue that intellectual property theory and
doctrine fail to account for the economic complementarity (and even
redundancy) of IP rights, and that policymakers must take account
of this type of overlap to a much greater extent in shaping the
boundaries of intellectual property protection.
I. EXTANT BOUNDARY-POLICING DOCTRINES IN IP LAW
Several doctrines within intellectual property law attempt to
reduce the incidence of overlapping rights. These doctrines define
the boundaries of particular rights in terms of the subject matter
eligible for protection, and they attempt to channel protection of
particular subject matter into one regime or another.
The boundaries these doctrines enforce, however, are defined
exclusively in terms of the object of protection. The functionality
doctrine in trademark law, for example, polices the boundary
between trademark and patent law by identifying features of a
product's design or packaging that trademark law will not reach
or
because they are "essential to the use or purpose of the article ...
features
article."'
Such
functional
the
cost
or
quality
of
the
[affect]
must be protected, if at all, by patent law. Indeed, the fact that a
claimed feature is or was the subject of a utility patent is strong
1. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quoting Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
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evidence of functionality and "adds great weight to the statutory
presumption that features are deemed functional until proven
otherwise."2 The functionality doctrine, then, serves primarily to
identify features which are properly the subject of patent law rather
than trademark law and channel protection of those features to the
patent system.3
The useful article doctrine similarly polices the boundary between
copyright and patent law by identifying and excluding from
copyright protection features of an article that are not separable
from the article's utilitarian function.4 Courts have articulated a
number of different tests for determining when particular features
are conceptually separable, but all of the tests are intended to
differentiate features that are integral to the function of the object
from those that are not. The Second Circuit in BrandirInternational
Inc. v. CascadePacificLumber Co.,5 for example, adopted a test that
distinguishes between "design elements [that] reflect a merger of
aesthetic and functional considerations, [such that] the artistic
2. Id. at 29-30.
3. Functionality also has a competitive dimension, though the Supreme Court has
cautioned against overemphasizing competitive need at the expense of the channeling
function. Specifically, the Court appeared to endorse the competitive need test of
functionality-under which a feature is deemed functional only when exclusive use of the
feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage-only in
cases of aesthetic functionality, where the patent interface is not at issue. Id. at 33 ("It is
proper to inquire into a 'significant non-reputation-related disadvantage' in cases of aesthetic
functionality, the question involved in Qualitex. Where the design is functional under the
Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive
necessity for the feature."). But even when seen through the lens of competitive necessity,
functionality is concerned fundamentally with identifying particular features of a product or
its packaging that should not receive trademark protection because of the non-sourcedesignating role those features play.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("[The design ofa useful article, as defined in this section, shall
be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.").
Though it is not obvious from the text of the statute, the feature need not be physically
separable to be copyrightable; conceptual separability from the utilitarian aspects of the
article is sufficient. Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 922 (7th Cir.
2004) ("It seems to be common ground between the parties and, indeed, among the courts and
commentators, that the protection of the copyright statute also can be secured when a
conceptual separability exists between the material sought to be copyrighted and the
utilitarian design in which the material is incorporated.").
5. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
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aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from
the utilitarian elements" and "design elements [that] can be identified as reflecting the designer's artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences [and therefore are conceptually
separable]. ' Likewise, although it adopted a somewhat different
test, the Seventh Circuit in Pivot Pointfocused on the contribution
of particular design elements to the utilitarian function of the
article:
Conceptual separability exists, therefore, when the artistic
aspects of an article can be conceptualized as existing independently of their utilitarian function. This independence is necessarily informed by whether the design elements can be identified as
reflecting the designer's artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences. If the elements do reflect the
independent, artistic judgment of the designer, conceptual
separability exists. Conversely, when the design of a useful
article is as much the result of utilitarian pressures as aesthetic
choices, the useful and aesthetic elements are not conceptually
separable. 7
All of these tests courts have used to evaluate conceptual
separability are similar to the tests for functionality in that, in both
contexts, courts exclude certain features from protection because of
the nature of those features. The useful article and functionality
doctrines reflect a judgment that certain features should be protected, if at all, with a particular form of rights, and they seek to
channel protection of those features to the "right" regime.8 This is
6. Id. at 1145.
7. Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 931; see also, Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773
F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985) (defining conceptually separable features as those "not in any
respect required by their utilitarian functions" or "wholly unnecessary to the performance of
the utilitarian function" and contrasting such features with those "inextricably intertwined
with the utilitarian [function]'); id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that conceptual
separability exists when an article "stimulate[s] in the mind of the beholder a concept that is
separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function"); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories
by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that features are conceptually
separable when the artistic features are "primary" and the utilitarian features "subsidiary").
8. Not all subject matter exclusions are motivated by concerns about overlapping rights.
The requirement that an invention be nonobvious to be patentable, for example, excludes a
number of inventions from patent protection. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (excluding
inventions that "would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
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the general thrust of channeling doctrines in intellectual property
law, of which there are other examples.9 Courts overwhelmingly
conceive of the overlap between types of IP protection in terms of
the forms of protection available for particular features. This focus
is not wrong; the various extant boundary-policing doctrines play
important roles in the intellectual property system. It is, however,
an incomplete account of overlapping rights.
II. IP RIGHTS AS COMPLEMENTARY OR SUBSTITUTE APPROPRIATION
MECHANISMS

Exclusive focus on particular features is odd because firms
evaluate their IP options from a product perspective rather than a
feature perspective. And it is clear that, at the product level, IP
rights have overlapping economic effects. Existing channeling doctrines do not capture this form of overlap because it arises not from
an attempt to claim multiple rights for the same features, but from
the use of different rights regimes to protect different aspects of a
single economic product or service. This is an important oversight
because firms relying on these multiple forms of protection are often
able to capture greater economic benefits than any of the individual
regimes assume.
McNeil Laboratories' strategy regarding Tylenol is a case study
here. Tylenol is a brand name pain reliever, the active ingredient of
which is acetaminophen (also known as paracetamol)." ° McNeil
having ordinary skill in the art," when "differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art").
Exclusion of obvious subject matter, however, is not motivated by a belief that obvious matter
is better protected through some other means; it is instead intended to prevent obvious matter
from being protected at all. Thus, while channeling doctrines operate by excluding subject
matter from certain forms of protection, they are not co-terminous with subject matter
exclusions.
9. Another example is the CopyrightAct's exclusion of"idea[s], procedure[s], process[es],
system[s], method[s] of operation, concept[s], principle[s], [and] discover[ies]." 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (2006); see Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes
from the Scope of Its Protection,85 TEX. L. REv. 1921, 1923 (2007) ("Congress intended for §
102(b) to codify the principal holdings of Baker and its progeny to limit the scope of copyright
protection in functional writings, such as programs."). A relatively large body of scholarship
struggles with the proper form (and scope) of protection for software. See, e.g., Symposium,
Toward a Third Intellectual PropertyParadigm,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2307 (1994).
10. Tylenol, http://www.tylenol.com/product detail.jhtml?id=tylenol/headbodyprod-reg.
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began selling acetaminophen in the United States in 1955 under
the name Tylenol Children's Elixir." Though various inventions
involving acetaminophen remain under patent, including one for
extended release acetaminophen particles patented in 2000,12 the
basic compound has long been in the public domain. 3 Indeed
Tylenol competes against a number of generic competitors who sell
acetaminophen preparations, in addition to the many other pain
relief and fever reducing products with different active ingredients.
Despite this competition, Tylenol, the chemical composition of which
is known and can be copied in exact or near exact form, retails at a
significant premium over generic versions of acetaminophen. 4
This is a serious puzzle because intellectual property theory
conceives of the economic consequences of different forms of protection in relative isolation. Consider, for example, the way the narratives of patent and trademark law conflict. According to the conventional patent narrative, patent rights are necessary because, in
their absence, competitors who avoided the fixed costs of invention
would be able to copy the invention and undercut the inventor's
price. 5 This would ultimately drive the price of the invention down
to (or near) the marginal cost of production, which would not be
sufficient for the inventor to recoup the costs of developing the
inc&prod=subpreg# (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
11. McNeil was not the first to market acetaminophen in the United States. That honor
goes to Sterling-Winthrop Co., which promoted acetaminophen as a gentler alternative to
aspirin. WALTER SNEADER, DRUG DISCOVERY: A HISTORY 439 (2005).
12. Extended Release Acetaminophen Particles, U.S. Patent No. 6,126,967 (filed Sept. 3,
1998) (issued Oct. 3, 2000).
13. Harmon Northrop Morse of Johns Hopkins University synthesized paracetamol in
1878, and Joseph von Mering first used it clinically in 1887. Alfio Bertolini et al., Paracetamol:
New Vistas of an Old Drug, 12 C.N.S. DRUG REV. 250, 251 (2006). Paracetamol, however, was
quickly disgarded in favor of phenacetin, another analgesic, which in turn was supplanted by
aspirin. Id. at 252.
14. According to Walgreens.com, as of May 8, 2009, a bottle of 50 Extra Strength Tylenol
EZ Tabs (500 mg) sold for $6.79, whereas 50 tablets of Walgreens Extra Strength Pain
Reliever (500 mg), the active ingredient of which is also acetaminophen, sold for $4.79.
http://www.walgreens.com/store/productlist.jsp?CATID=301393&navAction=jump&navCo
unt=0 (select "Save with Walgreens brand") (visited May 8, 2009) (site has since been
updated). In other words, Tylenol sells at a little more than a 40 percent price premium.
15. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003) ('CThe conventional rationale for granting legal
protection to inventions ... is the difficulty that a producer may encounter in trying to recover
his fixed costs of research and development when the product or process that embodies a new
invention is readily copiable.").
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invention. 16 Patent law therefore solves a problem of appropriability,
allowing firms to invest the time and resources necessary to develop
an invention with confidence they will be able to recoup their
investments by excluding others from copying the invention.17
The conventional trademark narrative, on the other hand, predicts very different behavior by market entrants. Specifically,
trademark law is thought necessary because, in its absence, competitors could enter the market and mimic a producer's goods or
services.1 8 This would, of course, be a good thing if the patent
narrative was true-if the entrants copied faithfully such that
consumers got essentially the same product regardless of the source.
But trademark law makes a different assumption-that entrants
will not copy faithfully but instead cut corners in order to make
their products more cheaply and increase their profit margins. They
could do so without worrying about losing customers because,
having copied the senior party's trademark, consumers would
attribute the products to the senior party and blame it for the
resulting poor quality.19 Eventually, consumers would lose faith in
the trademark as an indicator of quality and stop buying products
bearing that mark, or at least substantially discount the price
they would be willing to pay for those products. Mark owners will
know this, of course, and therefore will not invest in quality to begin
with. Trademark law, on this account, intervenes to preserve mark
16. Id.
17. As Landes and Posner note, patent law is also thought to give inventors incentive to
disclose their inventions rather than attempt to keep them secret. Id.; see also Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("First, patent law seeks to foster and reward
invention; second, it promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and
to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires."). Patent rights promote
disclosure because they help solve the "information paradox." Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents

and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017,
1029 (1989).
[I]t seems likely that the patent system at least facilitates disclosure by
creating rights in inventions that survive disclosure. Secrecy makes it difficult
for inventors to sell or license their inventions to others because it is difficult to
persuade someone to pay for an idea without disclosing it, yet once the invention
is disclosed, the inventor has nothing left to sell.
Id. The concept of the "information paradox" is widely credited to Kenneth Arrow. Kenneth

J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTivE AcTITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 (1962).

18. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 167.

19. Id. at 203.
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owners'incentives to invest in product quality by ensuring that they
will be able to internalize the benefits of any such investment.
There is clearly something to both of these narratives. Patent law
does, in many cases, enable inventors to recoup investment costs
they otherwise could not by enabling them to sell their inventions
at supracompetitive prices. And trademark law often does protect
the integrity of the quality signal a mark provides. But the patent
and trademark narratives cannot both be right, at least not at the
same time. Either market entrants have the incentive to copy a
product faithfully in order to compete with the inventor, or they do
not. If entrants are likely to copy very closely, then trademark
protection does little for consumers except raise the cost of the products they consume. If the parties' goods or services are of basically
the same quality, then consumers suffer little or no harm even if
they are confused about the source of the products they encounter.
If, on the other hand, entrants are likely to cut corners, producing
products that differ materially in quality, then trademark protection
takes on greater importance relative to patent law, assuming the
quality differences can be signaled through branding. Which of
these narratives is most accurate in any given context depends
on the dynamics of the market in question, and in particular on
whether the market value of a particular product derives primarily
from the invention itself or from its branding. But the likelihood
that competitors will copy faithfully matters quite a bit in determining whether patent and/or trademark law is necessary, as does the
extent to which any deviations in quality can be signaled effectively
through branding.
In many cases, branding is at least partially effective as an
appropriation mechanism. Producers frequently are able to signal
at least some product differences through branding, whether those
differences are tangible or not. As a result, firms selling branded
products are often able to charge somewhat higher prices than
competitors.2 ° Put differently, branding often enables producers
to price above marginal cost, even if not as much above marginal
cost as they could if they were insulated from direct competition
altogether.2
20. See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text.
21. Cf. Jonathan Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDozo L. REV.
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The market for Tylenol is paradigmatic of this effect. The active
ingredient of Tylenol is not protected by patent, and McNeil
therefore faces competition from a number of other acetaminophen
products, in addition to other pain reducing products with different
active ingredients. Yet McNeil continues to price Tylenol significantly above its competitors. 22 This price premium is a consequence
of branding. Through years of expensive brand building (that is,
advertising), McNeil has persuaded many consumers-rightly or
wrongly-that Tylenol is not interchangeable with its competitors'
nearly identical products. McNeil therefore is able to capture
through branding some of the supracompetitive profits patent law
is presumed necessary to provide."
McNeil's ability to maintain supracompetitive prices because
of the influence of branding is an instance of a phenomenon that
has generated much controversy in its own right.24 But it bears
1251 (2004) (arguing that producers can rely on a variety of private protection mechanisms,
including lead time and branding, as partial alternatives to patent protection).
22. See supra note 14.
23. Some law and economics scholars argue that this price premium does not entail
deadweight loss because consumers are paying extra for the guarantee of high quality
manufacturing or to avoid the cost of determining whether competitive products are in fact
equivalent. William Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275 (1987) ('The fact that two goods have the same chemical formula
does not make them of equal quality to even the most coolly rational consumer."). Even if
Landes and Posner are right that the price differential between Tylenol and generic
acetaminophen reflects rational consumer preferences, their argument suggests that
inventors can capture at least some of their investment in an invention through branding as
long as they can inform consumers of the differences between their products and competitors'.
24. Ralph Brown famously bemoaned trademark law's protection of the persuasive
function of trademarks, built through "wasteful" advertising. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1190 (1948)
("From what has been said earlier about the economic waste and distortion of consumer choice
growing out of large-scale persuasive advertising, it should be clear that the persuasive
function of trade symbols is of dubious social utility. There seems little reason why the courts
should recognize or protect interests deriving from it."). Debate about the legitimacy of
"artificial" product differentiation based on factors other than tangible product characteristics
rages on. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 173 ('The implicit economic model
that guides the law is our model, in which trademarks lower consumers' search costs by
providing them with valuable information about brands and encourage quality control rather
than create social waste and consumer deception. The hostile view of advertising anyway is
unsound."); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., TrademarkMonopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 420-21 n.212
(1999) (arguing that, to the extent advertising and trademark law generate an unthinking
buying response, it does not represent a legitimate form of welfare enhancement, that such
unthinking responses might ultimately lead to regret, and that some advertising is a form of
blackmail, playing on our insecurities and self-doubts).
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highlighting that McNeil has been able to maintain this price
differential for a product that, in basic form, has long been out of
patent.2 5 Advertising can be significantly more effective in creating
brand loyalty for products that are under patent because of the
exclusivity those products enjoy. The amount of advertising necessary to build significant brand loyalty for Prozac, for example,
undoubtedly was less than it would have been had Prozac faced
competition during the patent period.
In this way, it is not just that trademark protection can provide
some of the same type of economic benefits for which patent law is
presumed necessary, it also is that the existence of patent protection
actually enhances the value of branding and increases the opportunity for brand owners to insulate their products from competition in
the post-patent period. This may help explain the results of the
FTC's recent study of drug pricing, which showed that, while the
average price of drugs declines approximately 20 percent within two
years of generic entry, the prices of brand name drugs decline only
slightly and in some cases even increase slightly after generic
entry.2 6 And brand name pioneer drugs maintain significant price
premiums over their generic competitors.27 This is not simply a
phenomenon of the pharmaceutical industry either. In fact, recent

25. There are plenty of similar examples of companies being able to insulate their
products from effective competition even when competitors are able to sell chemically
identical products. In fact, the piece de resistance of modern marketing's ability to
differentiate products that are physically indistinguishable from those of competitors is
Morton's salt. Salt, like acetaminophen, has a known chemical composition. Yet Morton's has
managed to convince many of us that its salt is different. Clorox has done the same with
bleach, just as most sellers of bottled water have done with their products, which often come
from municipal water supplies. See Phil Lempert, Is Your Bottled Water Coming from a
Faucet?, MSNBC.COM, July 21, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5467759/; NATIONAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, BOTTLED WATER: PURE DRINK OR PURE HYPE? (1999),
http://www.nrdc.org/water/drinkingbw/bwinx.asp (documenting misleading suggestions that
bottled water is more pure).
26. FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY 9 (2002), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/O7/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
27. Id. (citing a "study of 32 drugs that lost patent protection around the time of the
passage of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments that found that generic entry results in
somewhat higher prices for brand-name prescription drugs (in light of factors such as inelastic
demand among users of brand-name products), but large decreases in the prices of
corresponding generic drugs").

884

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:873

economic studies have shown that firms often can leverage trademark rights and capture returns on innovative activity.2"
This failure of intellectual property theory to account for the
overlapping economic benefits of patent and trademark protection
is reflected in doctrine too, as none of the extant boundary-policing
doctrines focus on the ability of a firm to capture the same benefits
by using multiple forms of protection to protect different features.
Indeed, "courts have consistently held that a product's different
qualities can be protected simultaneously, or successively, by more
than one statutory means for protection of intellectual property." 9

III. ACCOUNTING FOR SUBSTITUTE APPROPRIATION MECHANISMS
A. Are OverlappingEconomic Benefits a Problem?
Is it a problem that different modes of intellectual property
protection can serve as alternative appropriation mechanisms?
In my view it is, at least to the extent that the effects of other forms
of protection are not accounted for in shaping the boundaries of
particular rights regimes. If, for example, the length of the patent
term is determined by reference to the amount of exclusivity
inventors need in order to have sufficient incentive to create and
disseminate new and useful inventions, and if estimates of the
necessary duration do not account for the economic benefits firms
can capture through branding, then the term is likely calibrated
incorrectly.
Concerns about the economic overlap I have identified have
received virtually no attention in case law and precious little in the
academic literature. The only extended discussion I am aware of
was offered by Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman in their
article Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property.3 °
28. See Lee Davis, How Do Trademarks Affect Firms' Incentives to Innovate? 3-4 (Sept.
6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (concluding that trademarks motivate
firms to engage in incremental innovation, particularly in the form of product differentiation,
and that firms can leverage trademarks indirectly to supplement other strategies of
appropriability like patents, secrecy, and lead time).
29. Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
30. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Toward an IntegratedTheory of Intellectual
Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455 (2002). Barnett's paper also deals generally with alternative
mechanisms for capturing economic benefits, but it deals only in part with the use of
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Parchomovsky and Siegelman refer to the overlapping economic
benefits I describe as the "synergistic" or "complementary" effects of
branding and patent protection. 31 As they note, "the limited monopoly afforded by patent protection may facilitate the establishment of brand loyalty during the patent life. '32 This brand loyalty,
acquired during the life of the patent, "enables patentees to preserve
some of their market share after the patent protection expires....
The net effect of combining patents and trademarks is stronger
protection than that afforded by either alone. 3 3
Parchomovsky and Siegelman, however, regard the ability of
firms to rely on trademark protection to maintain market sharewhat they refer to as "trademark leverage"--as efficiency-enhancing. In their view, the availability of trademark protection in the
post-patent period reduces an investor's incentive to price monopolistically during the patent period, decreasing deadweight loss
attributable to patent protection.3 5 The attendant welfare gains,
they argue, outweigh any welfare losses in the post-patent period,
during which the producers of the formerly patented products might
36
maintain prices above marginal cost.
Parchomovsky and Siegelman's model, however, dramatically
oversimplifies the interaction between trademark and patent
protection. For one thing, their model mischaracterizes the true
nature of the trademark protection available in the post-patent
period. In particular, Parchomovsky and Siegelman contrast a
post-patent world with trademark protection and one without any
trademarks at all. In the latter world, they argue, patentees would
take full advantage of the patent grant by pricing monopolistically. 8
They would have less incentive to invest in the quality of their
products or services, however, because they could not capture the
branding. Barnett, supra note 21.
31. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 30, at 1460, 1473, 1522.
32. Id. at 1473.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1462.
35. Id. at 1479-80.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1473.
38. Id. at 1473-74. This description is, to some extent, in tension with the view, now
widely accepted and endorsed by the Supreme Court, that patent protection does not
necessarily imply market power. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
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benefits of such investments through branding. But with trademark
protection available, inventors can maximize profits over both the
patent and post-patent periods by expanding their customer base
during the patent period in order to create brand loyalty they can
exploit after the patent's expiration.
In truth, the choices are not nearly as stark as Parchomovsky and
Siegelman suggest. Producers in the modern marketplace rely on a
variety of different branding devices to distinguish their products,
the word mark for the products being only one such device. One has
to account for the full range of these branding devices to accurately
assess the interaction between trademark and patent law, since
patentees may not need all of those branding devices to protect the
incentives Parchomovsky and Siegelman identify. Even if trademark law prevented Eli Lilly from claiming the word "Prozac" as a
trademark after the patent covering that compound expired, such
that competitors could produce the same drug and sell their own
versions of the drug as Prozac, Eli Lilly would not be disabled from
differentiating its product. 9 Rather, Eli Lilly would simply be forced
to rely on branding devices other than the name of the drug-the
name of the company producing the drug, for example-to distinguish its product from those of competitors. The fact that company
names at least partially fulfill the need for source identification is
implicit in Parchomovsky and Siegelman's discussion of the spillover of brand loyalty between different products made by the same
firm.4" It is the common company name that enables such spillovers.
Yet Parchomovsky and Siegelman do not account for other aspects
of branding like company names or product packaging in evaluating
the costs of refusing word mark protection in the post-patent period.
By itself, that failure calls Parchomovsky and Siegelmans conclusions into question since, in the real world, the other aspects of
branding matter quite a bit. Tropicana recently announced it had
redesigned the packaging of its refrigerated orange juice brand. The
new design, according to Tropicana, was protected by twenty design
trademarks and copyrights, separate and apart from any trademark
protection for the word marks on the container.4 1 Tropicana's juice
39. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 30, at 1473-74.
40. Id. at 1484-86.
41. Kenneth Hein, Tropicana Squeezes Out Fresh Design with a Peel, BRANDWEEK.COM,
Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.brandweek.comfbw/content-display/esearch/e3if42f3145e3efa9c
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is not patented and never was. But for those products that are
patented or have patented components, understanding the combined
effect of patent and trademark protection is surely much more
complicated than asking whether competitors can use a single word
mark, or even some subset of the design features.
In the end, while Parchomovsky and Seigelman are no doubt
correct that Tropicana would need some way to communicate the
source of its product and to distinguish it from competing products,
that observation tells us little about the scope of protection necessary. Yet the consequences for competitors, and the extent to which
trademark protection duplicates the economic incentives of patent
law, depend significantly on what branding elements an inventor
can protect. If, for example, a former patent owner could prevent
competitors from mimicking not only a product's brand name but
also the design of the product or its packaging, "second movers
[might] face a barrier to entering the market because they will
have to convince consumers that a product with a quite different
appearance is functionally the same as the known product."42
Something similar could be said about Parchomovsky and
Siegelman's narrow focus on competitors' use of the inventor's
trademark. Protection against use of an identical mark for directly
competitive products is, of course, at the core of a trademark owner's
rights. But a party's rights extend much further under modern standards. Specifically, a mark owner can enforce its rights against any
use that is likely to cause confusion among consumers about the
source of the imitator's goods or services. So whereas Tropicana's
ability to sell its orange juice at a supracompetitive price is dictated
primarily by the actions of its direct competitors, the full value, and
the full cost, of trademark protection is a function not only of the
481a81cd68b13e3db. These changes apparently were not well-received, and Pepsi (owner of
the Tropicana brand) decided to abandon them less than two months after introducing the
new design. Stuart Elliot, TropicanaDiscovers Some Buyers arePassionate,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 2009, at B6.
42. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation,83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337,387 (2008). Abramowicz and Duffy see such a barrier
to entry as a good thing, in at least some cases, since it may allow a first mover to capture
benefits of market experimentation that cannot be captured through patent protection. Lee
Davis, on the other hand, suggests that trademark protection that creates barriers to entry
might block innovation, possibly by making it more difficult for more innovative companies
to enter a market with a noninnovative incumbent with a strong trademark. Davis, supra
note 28, at 14-17.
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number of different features Tropicana can protect, but also the
range of contexts in which it can protect those marks. For example,
the value of Tropicana's trademark rights and the extent to which
those rights interfere with competition are likely quite different if
Tropicana can sustain a claim against Google for returning paid
search results in response to searches for "Tropicana" than they
would be if Google could easily defeat such suits.4 3 The value of a
brand and the cost of protection likewise may differ substantially
depending on how robustly the comparative advertising privilege
applies vis-A-vis competitors who purchase the keywords.
On the cost side, Parchomovsky and Siegelman oversimplify
market behavior in order to minimize the costs of supracompetitive
pricing in the post-patent period. First, they assume brand loyalty
in the post-patent period depends only on the size of the customer
base established during the patent's life." This assumption allows
Parchomovsky and Siegelman to conclude that there is no welfare
loss when the patentee continues to charge a supracompetitive
price in the post-patent period. According to Parchomovsky and
Siegelman, the only consumers who will be paying the supracompetitive price in the post-patent period will be the loyal customers
previously attracted by the patent owner; all of the additional
customers who enter the market after expiration will buy at the
competitive price from market entrants.4 5 Thus, although the loyal
consumers will continue to pay more than marginal cost, output will
reach competitive levels, and the only effects will be distributional-higher profits for the patentee.
But in fact consumers prefer brand name products, and find
competing products inadequate substitutes, for a variety of reasons
other than prior experience with a product. Consumers may prefer
43. Courts continue to struggle to determine whether use of another's trademark to
trigger paid search results violates the mark owner's rights. While the Second Circuit once
seemed prepared to reject such claims on the ground that the search engine's use is not
"trademark use," it now seems to have joined courts in other circuits in rejecting the
trademark use argument. Eric Goldman, Keyword Law, http://www.ericgoldman.org
Resources/keywordlaw.pdf (last visited Oct 22,2009) (collecting cases addressing the question
of whether keyword use is "use in commerce").
44. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 30, at 1477 ("Inherent in the definition of
brand loyalty is the notion of prior use. Indeed, it would be odd for consumers to be loyal to
a product they have never tried.").
45. Id. at 1479-80.
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familiar established products, even if they have not previously been
in the market for such goods.4" They may have brand preferences
learned from their parents' consumption patterns. For example,
people tend to buy the same household products (toothpaste,
laundry detergent, and so on) as were in their households as
children.4 7 And consumers may prefer certain brands as cultural
objects through which they can express their individuality and/or
participate in cultural phenomena.48 Consumer preference for the
iPod, for example, likely has as much to do with the device's cultural
meaning as with prior product experience.49
In the case of prescription drugs, brand preferences depend in
significant part on the prescribing doctor's prior experience with the
drug. And doctors' prescribing habits, it is becoming increasingly
clear, are not based entirely on information about drug effectiveness.5 ° Indeed, the evidence suggests that doctors fall into habits
and become accustomed to prescribing certain drugs for particular
conditions. They are then reluctant to change their habits even in

46. Cf Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 42, at 383 n.131 (recognizing that theoretical
economic models sometimes may understate the extent of brand name preferences since "[i]n
many contexts, it is possible that new customers will prefer the established product even
absent evidence of superior quality").
47. See, e.g., Doug Grisaffe & Hieu Nguyen, Falling in Love with Brands: An Inductive
QualitativeExplorationof Pathways to EmotionalAttachment, 36 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES.
869, 870 (2009) ("It should be noted that inter-generational transfer [of an emotional
connection to a brand] doesn't require sentimental/emotional memory. Transfer alone could
involve a user of Tide simply saying her grandmother had used it, her mother used it, and so
she uses it too."); see also E. Fraj Andres, R. Bravo Gil & E. Martinez Salinas, Family as a
Source of Consumer-BasedBrand Equity, 16 J. PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 188, 195-96 (2007)
("[P]ositive brand information, provided by the family to the young adult via observation, has
an important influence on the brand equity formation process.").
48. See generally ROB WALKER, BUYING IN: THE SECRET DIALOGUE BETWEEN WHAT WE
BUY AND WHO WE ARE (2008). Walker chronicles the cultural significance of a number of
brands and describes the ways in which consumers use brands simultaneously to differentiate
and to signal belonging to a particular group.
49. Brands, according to Glynn Lunney, have "popularity networks." Lunney, supra note
24, at 429.
50. One recent study found that access to free drug samples had a significant effect on the
prescribing practices of residents. Richard F. Adair & Leah R. Holmgren, Do Drug Samples
Influence Resident PrescribingBehavior?A Randomized Trial, 118 AM. J. MED. 881 (2005)
(finding that residents with access to drug samples were less likely to choose unadvertised
drugs than residents who did not have access to samples and less likely to choose over-thecounter drugs, and also finding a trend toward less use of inexpensive drugs).
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the face of information that a drug is not the most effective treatment.51
Whether or not these factors influencing brand preferences are
rational in a classical sense, they have real effects in a number of
different markets. The important point is that preferences for the
branded products in the post-patent period are a function of much
more than prior experience with the product during the patent
period. We therefore cannot blithely assume that all of the new consumers are paying a competitive price and that all those paying the
supracompetitive price developed their loyalty during the patent
period. Yet those assumptions are critical to Parchomovsky and
Siegelman's conclusion that trademark
law creates no deadweight
52
loss in the post-patent period.
B. Taking Interaction into Account
If, as I have suggested, there are reasons to be concerned about
the ability of firms to leverage different types of intellectual prop51. Judith K. Hellerstein, The Importance of the Physician in the Generic Versus TradeName PrescriptionDecision, 29 RAND J. ECON. 108 (1998) (describing the role of physicians
in the decision to use brand name drugs or generic substitutes and the tendency of certain
physicians to prescribe one or the other, a tendency not explained by patient characteristics).
Indeed, prescribing habits may be resistant even to information regarding drugs' serious
risks. Sandra H. Johnson, PollutingMedical Judgment? FalseAssumptions in the Pursuitof
False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing,9 MINN. J. L. ScI. & TECH. 61, 79 (2008)
("[W]hile changes in drug labeling regarding warnings of previously unknown, serious risks
are often mailed or faxed directly to physicians, studies indicate that these mailings do not
result in changes in prescribing practice-that physicians frequently prescribed drugs in
violation of warnings, including black box warnings.") (citing Jerry H. Gurwitz, Serious
Adverse Drug Effects-Seeing the Trees Through the Forest,354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1413, 1414
(2006)).
52. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 30, at 1465. Abramowicz and Duffy similarly
downplay the extent to which brand preferences impose barriers to competitive entry when
they approvingly summarize Parchomovsky and Siegelman's thesis. Abramowicz & Duffy,
supra note 42, at 389. Abramowicz and Duffy dismiss any welfare losses caused by
supracompetitive prices in the post-patent period, arguing that former patent owners have
incentive to keep the differential down because new competitors will be able to enter the
market easily and offer the formerly patented product at the competitive price. Id. But, of
course, this incentive is inversely proportional to the strength of brand preferences. The
greater consumers' brand preferences in the post-patent period, the higher their switching
costs and the lower the incentive to keep price differential down. And in those cases when the
price differential is relatively small because brand preferences are weak, then the patentees
have little trademark leverage and there is little reason for the patentee to price below
monopolistic levels during the patent period.
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erty protection and thereby generate overlapping or redundant
economic benefits, then the question is what, if anything, should be
done about it. Broadly speaking, there are two possible approaches
to reducing the incidence of leverage: (1) forcing claimants to elect
the form of protection they wish to pursue, and (2) actively accounting for overlapping economic benefits in shaping the scope of particular rights.
1. A New Doctrine of Election?
One method for reducing firms' opportunities to leverage multiple
forms of IP protection would be to implement a variation of the now
discredited doctrine of election." This new doctrine of election would
differ from the one rejected in Yardley in that it would not focus on
whether the same features of a product were subject to multiple
forms of protection. 4 Instead, this election doctrine would force a
firm to elect between forms of protection at the product level. In the
context of a new drug, for example, the inventor would be forced to
elect between patent protection for the drug and trademark protection for the name of the drug. If the inventor chose to patent the
new drug, competitors would be free at the expiration of the patent
not only to produce the same compound but to sell it under the same
name. This doctrine, then, would be a stronger version of the
Singer" and Kellogg 6 approach-indeed, like the versions of Singer
and Kellogg that Parchomovsky and Siegelman criticize.57
53. See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (rejecting the notion that an
author-inventor must elect between copyright and design patent protection).
54. Id.
55. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
56. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
57. Parchomovsky and Siegelman suggest that Singer and Kellogg "may be read to have
established a per se rule that a mark designating a patented product becomes generic at the
end of the patent term." Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supranote 30, at 1471. Though some
language in those cases could be read to support their claim, courts have not read the cases
as establishing a per se rule. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277,
288 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e find that there is no per se prohibition against features disclosed
in a patent receiving trademark protection after the patent has expired."); Bayer Co. v. United
Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (rejecting a per se rule and noting that "[s]ince
[Singer] courts have several times said that the name of goods protected by patent might in
fact indicate not only the kind of goods they were, but as well that they emanated from a
single source") (citations omitted); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:52 (4th ed. 2009) ("Some judicial opinions and legal writers have
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Such an election doctrine would be motivated by recognition of
the tension between the narratives of patent and trademark protection. In particular, this doctrine would appreciate that competitors either are likely to copy a formerly patented product faithfully-in which case the competitors' products are likely to be
relatively indistinguishable-or they are likely to cut corners,
producing goods of different quality. This observation is important
because, if we had confidence that competitors were producing
relatively indistinguishable products, then branding would offer
little quality-related information and would only create "artificial"
distinctions. If, on the other hand, there are likely to be material
differences between the inventor's products and those of competitors, then branding becomes more important to consumers, and it
ought to allow producers to capture the benefits of quality differences.
Election, as opposed to a predetermined rule in favor of a particular form of protection,5" would be proper here as a recognition
that the inventor is in the best position to know where competitors
are likely to find value. If close copying is likely, then the inventor
would rationally choose patent protection and would capture value
during the period of patent exclusivity. If, on the other hand, the
inventor suspects that competitors will cut corners and consumers
are likely to care about quality differences, then it would rationally
choose to forego patent protection and elect to brand the product.

misconstrued the law by stating that when patent rights expire, the mark of the patented
article will automatically fall into the public domain along with the invention of the patent.
However, this is not the law, and never has been."). Instead courts have understood Singer
and Kellogg to establish a more limited rule prohibiting producers of formerly patented
products from relying on de facto secondary meaning to establish consumer association when
there is evidence the primary significance of the term to the consuming public is the product
rather than the producer. Cf. J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., Inc., 280 F.2d 437, 440
(C.C.P.A. 1960) ("we will concede, arguendo, that under such circumstances, where there is
only one source for a particular kind of merchandise over a period of time, the public might
come to associate that source with the name by which the merchandise is called. But such a
circumstance cannot take the common descriptive name of an article out of the public domain
and give the temporary exclusive user of it exclusive rights to it, no matter how much money
or effort it pours into promoting the sale of the merchandise."). The per se rule Parchomovsky
and Siegelman oppose, however, is close to what I have in mind as a new election doctrine.
58. A rule, for example, that would require the inventor to rely only on patent protection
and would disqualify her from trademark or copyright protection.
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Pushing important decisions to the party with the best information about the relevant considerations is a common policymaking
tool, and in many cases it is the best solution. And contrary to
Parchomovsky and Siegelman, forcing an election would not prevent
sellers from distinguishing their products after patent expiration.59
Even after the court determined that "shredded wheat" was a
generic term, the National Biscuit Company was able to distinguish
its shredded wheat from Kellogg's shredded wheat by using its
company name and elements of product packaging. Indeed the court
in that case made it clear that, even though Kellogg was entitled to
call its product shredded wheat, it was obligated to make clear that
Kellogg, and not National Biscuit Company, was the source of the
product Kellogg was selling.6 °
Nevertheless, I suspect that an election doctrine would not work
particularly well to prevent parties from leveraging multiple forms
of protection, or at least that such an approach would create as
many problems as it solved. One significant problem was foreshadowed by the earlier discussion of the many different branding
devices sellers use for individual products or services. Return for a
moment to the Tropicana example. If, as in our hypothetical,
Tropicana's juice had once been patented, Tropicana would be
precluded under an election regime from branding the juice product.
But, as we noted, Tropicana claimed protection for more than
twenty different branding elements on the juice's packaging, not
including the Tropicana word mark. For an election doctrine to be
effective, courts would need some way to determine which of those
branding devices Tropicana would be precluded from protecting
through trademark law. If a court did not disqualify enough of the
features, Tropicana would retain a significant amount of the
leverage the election doctrine was designed to avoid. But if the court
disqualified too many features, it could approach the point where
Tropicana could not sufficiently distinguish its juice from that of its
competitors.
We need not be too concerned that sellers will not be able to
distinguish themselves in cases like Kellogg, or in any case in which

59. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 30, at 1476.
60. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120-21.
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the patented invention is sold as a discrete product.6 1 But the
problem is much more acute in cases involving patented component
parts. In those cases, a court would have to determine whether
election of patent protection for a particular component (a microchip, for example) would prevent the seller from using the brand
name for the entire product (a computer device). Put differently,
courts would have to determine which products the mark owner
could not brand because of the election of patent protection for some
part(s) of the product. This would presumably require a determination of the relevant product market at issue, and as we have seen in
antitrust law, determining what constitutes an economic product
market is quite difficult.62
2. Cross-BoundaryAccounting
In light of these difficulties, an election doctrine of the type I
described may not be practicable. It is therefore incumbent on
scholars and policymakers to consider much more actively how
firms' ability to choose from a menu of alternative, and often complementary, appropriation mechanisms should impact the scope of
the various IP rights. In my view, this active consideration should
be done with an eye towards reducing the ability of firms to leverage
multiple rights to capture redundant economic benefits. But
thinking about the issue in this way has an added virtue: even those
persuaded by Parchomovsky and Siegelman that leverage can be
efficiency enhancing ought to embrace active consideration of the
combined effects of various forms of protection. After all, if leverage
is good, we should want to create rules that enable it. And obviously
we can better enable leverage if we focus on the ways each set of
rights influences the others.
This greater consideration of economic overlap will not be a
simple task. In fact, it is likely to be extraordinarily complicated
because the economic spillovers will often run in many directions.
Taking as initial examples just those issues we have already
61. Such an election doctrine may, however, discourage sellers from branding individual
products with their company names in order to preserve more branding devices.
62. See, e.g., 2B PHILIP E. AREEDA, JOHN L. SOLOw & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW §§ 560-66 (3d ed. 2008); RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA 211
(1996).
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identified, the scope of both patent and trademark law ought to be
informed by the influence of the other. If it is true that brand loyalty
can more effectively be established during the patent period, then
we might have reason to suspect less trademark protection is
necessary for producers to be able to differentiate their products
effectively in the post-patent period. Conversely, the greater the
scope of trademark protection-both in terms of the number and
type of features subject to protection and the entities against whom
one can assert trademark rights-the greater a producer's ability to
differentiate and price supracompetitively. This suggests that
broader trademark protection-and trademark protection has been
expanding rapidly over the last half century 3-- obviates some of the
need for patent protection, at least for those inventions sold in the
consumer marketplace. Copyright protection will also play a role
here, sometimes even for the same products. Software, for example,
often is protected by both patent and copyright, while various
branding elements of the software receive trademark protection. At
least in some cases, a company can leverage all three types of IP
protection to capture economic benefits, and the interaction of all
three forms must be considered.
Despite the challenges in doing so, focusing on the interaction of
different IP rights is important because the balance we choose
between the various forms of protection will affect the incentives we
create, and perhaps the types of inventions we get at the margin.
For example, if Parchomovsky and Siegelman are right that
trademark leverage allows an inventor to claim greater profits in
the long-run, then an IP system that enables such leverage will
incentivize firms to produce products for which brand building is
most likely to pay off in the post-patent period. Because brand
loyalty implies loyalty of consumers, allowing trademark leverage
may well affect resource allocation in the direction of more consumer products. In the case of drugs, for example, resources might
be directed toward drugs that will be marketed directly to consumers rather than drugs marketed to (or through) hospitals. 4
63. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundationsof Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1839, 1896-1915 (2007).
64. Cf. Davis, supra note 28, at 14-15 (noting that trademark protection might influence
resource allocation towards incremental improvements in existing products rather than to
more experimental forms of innovation).
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Policymakers need to understand these incentives, determine
whether they are desirable, and identify doctrinal tools that might
limit any negative consequences before embracing a model that
advocates or tolerates leverage.
CONCLUSION

This brief sketch of the issues that will be involved in accounting
for economic overlap is undoubtedly oversimplified, and there are
surely many issues I have not even identified. What I hope this
Article has done, however, is to focus our collective attention on
firms' ability to employ alternative and complementary appropriation mechanisms, and the failure of IP theory to account for this
type of overlap between the various modes of IP protection. Much
more work needs to be done to identify the ways doctrinal rules in
particular IP regimes impact the need for, and the scope of, other
types of intellectual property rights. This needs to be done not only
at the feature level of the current channeling doctrines, but at the
economic product level-the level at which most appropriation strategies are adopted. As is becoming increasingly clear elsewhere in IP,
the effects are likely to be quite different in different markets.6" In
boundary terms, then, this Article is a starting point rather than a
finish line. But hopefully it identifies the right track.

65. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEiLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT (2009) (describing the ways the patent system is perceived differently, and has
different costs and benefits, in different industries); Michael W. Carroll, One For All: The
Problemof Uniformity Cost in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 55AM. U. L. REv. 845 (2006); Michael
W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 421 (2007).

